SVG Dimension Capping Bypass via XML Comment Injection in @dicebear/converter ensureSize()

Description

The ensureSize() function in @dicebear/converter used a regex-based approach to rewrite SVG width/height attributes, capping them at 2048px to prevent denial of service. This size capping could be bypassed by crafting SVG input that causes the regex to match a non-functional occurrence of <svg before the actual SVG root element.

Recommendation

Update the @dicebear/converter package to the latest compatible version. Followings are version details:

• Affected version(s): <= 9.4.1
• Patched version(s): 9.4.2

References

• GHSA-7j2x-32w6-p43p
• CVE-2026-33418
• CWE-185
• CAPEC-310
• OWASP 2021-A6

Related Issues

• Uncontrolled memory allocation via crafted SVG dimensions in @dicebear/converter - CVE-2026-29112
• fast-xml-parser has an entity encoding bypass via regex injection in DOCTYPE entity names - CVE-2026-25896
• fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: XML Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters - CVE-2026-41650
• SVG Injection via Unsanitized Options in @dicebear/core and @dicebear/initials - CVE-2026-33311

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Tags:

npm

@dicebear/converter