Description
The Local REST API’s /vault/{path} endpoints (GET/PUT/PATCH/POST/DELETE) percent-decode the request path inside the handler — after Express has already routed and normalized it, then hand it to the Obsidian vault adapter with no confinement check. A literal ../ is resolved/rejected at the routing layer (→ 404), but %2F is not a separator there, so ..%2F..%2F survives routing and is only turned into a real / by the handler’s decodeURIComponent, reconstituting a `..
Recommendation
Update the obsidian-local-rest-api package to the latest compatible version. Followings are version details:
- Affected version(s): < 4.1.3
- Patched version(s): 4.1.3
References
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